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This paper examines the determinants of new plant locations. In particular, the paper 
looks at whether discretionary government grants influence the location of new plants, 
and how effective these incentives are in the presence of agglomeration and urbanisation 
externalities – that is, benefits arising from locating near to other firms in the same 
industry or in an area with a diverse industrial structure. The specific government grants 
we consider are Regional Selective Assistance grants that are available in designated 
Assisted Areas of the UK. 
 
We examine these questions using data on new plant entrants to the production sector in 
Great Britain, together with matched information on Regional Selective Assistance grant 
offers. We look at those new entrants that appear a priori to be more mobile – new plants 
owned by existing firms, (either UK groups or foreign multinationals).  
 
Our findings are of interest in the context of government policies concerned with regional 
variation in economic performance. We find evidence that regional industrial structure 
affects the location of new entrants. Firms in more agglomerated industries locate new 
plants near to others in the same industry, and firms are also attracted to industrially 
diversified l ocations. In line with other work in this area we find that foreign 
multinationals locate new plants near to other foreign-owned plants in the same industry. 
Fiscal incentives in the form of Regional Selective Assistance grants are found to have 
some effect in attracting plants to Assisted Areas. 
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1  Introduction 
This paper examines the determinants of the location of new plants. In particular, it 
investigates whether the availability of government subsidies influences where firms locate 
activity, and the extent to which this type of intervention is effective in the face of 
countervailing incentives for firms to concentrate geographically. We examine these 
questions using data on new plant entrants to the production sector in Great Britain, together 
with matched information on discretionary government grants. We find evidence that 
regions’ existing industrial structures have an important effect on entrants’ location decisions, 
and that discretionary grants also have some effect.  
The formation of new firms and plants is an important driver of both productivity growth and 
employment opportunities.
1 For example, the entry of high productivity firms affects the level 
and growth rate of productivity by introducing new ideas, new goods and new production 
techniques into the market, and by increasing competition. Entrants bring new ideas and 
production methods that may spillover to other firms, especially those in close geographic 
proximity to an entrant,
2 and new entry affects employment opportunities in local labour 
markets. 
A number of factors may attract firms to particular locations. Firms may choose to locate in 
particular regions in order to be close to demand, or to access immobile factors such as 
natural resources or transport infrastructure. Externalities arising from the co-location of 
firms have also been emphasised as an important factor affecting entrants’ location 
decisions. Two sets of externalities can be distinguished; those generated by the co-location 
or agglomeration of firms within the same or related industries, and those generated by the 
co-location of firms across diverse industries.  
                                                 
1 See inter alia, Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) who show that in the US new plants account for a significant 
fraction of new jobs created. Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003) provide evidence on the importance of entry in 
accounting for aggregate productivity growth in the UK.   3
Marshall (1890) identifies knowledge spillovers, labour market risk pooling, and vertical 
linkages as the main sources of industry agglomeration economies. More generally these 
have been classified as Marshallian or MAR (Marshall-Arrow-Romer) factor market 
externalities.
3 These theories suggest that firms that use similar technologies, inputs, and 
types of workers may co-locate. For example, firms that require similarly skilled labour, and 
workers that possess those skills may locate together in order to insure themselves from 
hiring and firing costs. Ellison and Glaeser (1999), using US plant level data, provide 
evidence that for some agglomerated sectors such as textiles, labour market pooling is the 
dominant factor driving co-location. Empirical evidence also suggests that technological 
spillovers may be geographically concentrated,
4 making it attractive for firms to locate 
together. When a component of knowledge is tacit and can only be transferred by direct 
contact, firms’ ability to capture spillovers may diminish as geographical proximity 
decreases.  
It is well established that the geographic distribution of plants is concentrated, both across 
sectors and within individual industries. Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2002), henceforth 
DGS, and Duranton and Overman (2002) provide evidence on the geographic distribution 
of production activity in Great Britain, and find examples of industries such as the ceramics 
and lace industries that are highly localised. Studies in other countries find similar evidence.
5 
Empirical work that has examined the dynamics of agglomeration includes Dumais, Ellison 
and Glaeser (2002) who use US data to show that new plant entries have acted to reduce 
the extent of industry agglomeration; industry concentrations have attracted less than their 
proportionate share of new entrants. This may be due a decrease in the extent of 
                                                                                                                                            
2 See Jaffe et al (1993) for evidence that technological spillovers are geographically concentrated. 
3 See Henderson, V. (1999), David and Rosenbloom (1990), Arthur (1994), Krugman, Fujita, Venables (1999). 
4 See, inter alia, Jaffe et. al (1993) and Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002). 
5 For evidence for the US see Ellison and Glaeser (1997), Krugman (1991); and for France see Maurel and Sédillot 
(1999).   4
agglomeration externalities over time, or due to the onset of congestion effects, as 
competition for immobile factors of production drives up the price of inputs, and creates 
incentives for firms to disperse geographically. Contrary to this, DGS (2002) find that in a 
number of the most agglomerated industries in Great Britain, new entry during the 1980s 
was acting to re-enforce geographic concentration, even though the agglomerations date 
back decades and in some cases even centuries.  
In contrast to MAR externalities, Jacobs (1969) asserts that firms may benefit from 
externalities arising in regions with a diverse industrial structure, or from ‘urbanisation 
economies’. For example, innovative firms may benefit from technological developments in 
industries other than their own, or from a local, varied science base.
6 This may make 
diversified regions more attractive than specialised regions. A region can both have a 
diversified industrial structure and have a significant proportion of activity in one industry, 
and so also contain an industry agglomeration. 
As a result of the processes described above, and many other factors such as differences in 
local infrastructure, the relative attractiveness of locations differs and productive activity is 
unevenly distributed across geographic space. Many governments intervene in firms’ 
location decisions and offer direct incentives that aim to attract mobile investment to specific 
geographic locations, such as areas with high unemployment.
7 In this paper we are interested 
in the interaction between co-location externalities and government intervention in the form 
of fiscal incentives. We investigate the role that Regional Selective Assistance (RSA), a 
large-scale discretionary policy instrument, has played in influencing plant location in specific 
areas of Great Britain, and how the responsiveness of plants to this financial incentive is 
affected by the presence of agglomeration externalities. For example, in industries 
                                                 
6 In the Jovanovic (1982) model firms learn about their efficiency as they operate. 
7 For example in France the Prime d’Aménagement du Territoire aims to create or safeguard jobs in specific regions.   5
characterised by strong agglomeration externalities are larger financial incentives required to 
induce plants to locate away from a region with an existing concentration of plants? 
Our model of entrant location considers new plants that are likely to be mobile. We apply 
this to new plants in the British production sector between 1986 and 1992 that are set up by 
foreign-owned multinationals or by existing UK-owned firms. One of the aims of RSA is to 
attract internationally mobile investment, which might be expected to apply to these types of 
new plants. The choice of location is modelled in a discrete choice framework as a function 
of characteristics of each region, plant and industrial sector.  
The recent empirical literature on the location decisions of firms suggests that agglomeration 
externalities matter, i.e. that firms locate near similar firms, and that policy interventions, 
particularly in the form of fiscal incentives, can play a role.
8  Head et al (1999) use a discrete 
choice model to examine the locations of new Japanese-owned establishments across US 
states. Among the factors that they find influence location are positive effects of the number 
of US-owned establishments in the same industry, and the number of Japanese-owned 
establishments both within and outside the industry. The authors also found significant effects 
from certain policy instruments, including lower tax rates, job creation subsidies and the 
existence of foreign trade zones. Holmes (1998) uses a different approach to investigate the 
impact of US states’ pro-business policies on the location of plants. Looking at plants 
located near borders, he finds that such policies have a significant effect. A paper that looks 
at the effects of policy instruments on the location choices of foreign multinationals within 
France, Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2003), finds little evidence of an impact of either 
Eurpean regional policy or French n ational policy. The authors do find evidence of 
agglomeration effects that differ by industry and the nationality of the firm. Guimaraes et al 
(2000) investigate the impact of within-industry spillovers on the plant locations chosen by 
                                                 
8  See Hines (1999) and Devereux and Griffith (2002) for surveys of the impact of fiscal incentives on firms’ 
location.   6
foreign multinational companies in Portugal. They use small regional units, in an attempt to 
identify the impact of very local spillovers. They too find significant agglomeration effects. 
Harhoff (1999) conducts an empirical analysis of the relationship between historically given 
industry and regional structure and the rate of new firm formation in Germany. He examines 
whether there are differences in the structural conditions required for the formation of new 
high-tech versus new low-tech firms and whether regional specialisation and diversity have a 
positive or negative impact on the regional rate of firm formation in an industry. He finds that 
there is strong evidence of regional spillover effects. Regions that are specialised are found 
to be attractive to firms within the same industry. Industry diversity within a region is found 
to be more important for firm formation in high-tech industries than in low R&D intensity 
industries. The formation of high-tech start-ups is positively correlated with the number of 
knowledge workers and infrastructure within regions, for example the employment share of 
scientists and engineers. 
At the international level Devereux and Griffith (1998) look at the effect of profits taxes on 
the location of US multinational firms. They find that corporate income taxes have an effect 
on a firm’s decision of which country within Europe to locate in, but not on the choice 
between exporting, locating in Europe or not serving the foreign market at all. Agglomeration 
effects are also found to play a significant role. Ford and Strange (1999) investigate the 
choice of European country as a location for non-European multinationals, in this case 
Japanese-owned firms. Like Head et al (1999), they find that Japanese firms tend to locate 
in countries which have already had significant inward investment from Japan.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we outline a model of firm 
location choice. In section 3 we describe the data on RSA grants, on new entrants and on 
industry agglomeration that is used in estimation and in section 4 we present our empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes.   7
2   A model of firm location choice 
We consider a model of firm location choice in which firms can benefit from locating near to 
other similar firms because of co-location externalities that arise through the labour market, 
technology spillovers and shared infrastructure. Factors that do not vary across geographic 
locations, such as firm and industry characteristics, will not affect firms’ location choices 
except to the extent that they affect firms’ sensitivity to other factors. We are interested in 
modelling the impact of regional grants in this model. Firms choose whether and where to 
apply for a grant. The policy maker then decides whether to make an offer, and finally the 
firm then decides whether or not to take up the offer and chooses where to locate 
production. 
We consider a firm that has chosen to locate production in Great Britain and is choosing 
between regions, k = 1…K. Expected profits for a firm i in industry j in region k at time t 
are denoted as  ijkt P ; below we use only these subscripts only where necessary. The firm 
will choose to locate in the region in which expected profits are highest. We define  ikt y  as 
an indicator of whether a firm locates in region k 
otherwise.      0
k m       if      1
=
„ " P > P = imt ikt ikt y
             (1) 
Profits are given by revenue minus costs. We assume that firms produce differentiated goods 
that are sold in a national (or international) product market so that the demand curve faced 
by the firm is fixed, and price is affected only by total quantity, and is independent of the 
region in which the firm is located. Thus regional variation in profits comes through the cost 
function. Profits depend on a number of firm (x), industry (v), region (z), firm-region (h) and 
industry-region (p) characteristics, all of which can (in principle) be time varying: 
( ) jkt ikt kt jt it ijt p h z v x , , , , P = P .              (2)   8
The factors that enter the firm’s decision over where to locate will be those that vary across 
regions. This means that factors that vary only over firm, industry or time, drop out of the 
location decision. Assuming a linear approximation of profits for each firm in each location 
implies 
ikt jkt ikt kt ikt e p h z + + + + = P 5 4 1 b b b a .            (3) 
Region characteristics ( kt z ) include a measure of region size, local government expenditure, 
demographics and region fixed effects. Region-industry characteristics ( kjt p ) include 
industry agglomeration and diversity measures and wages, described below. Region-firm 
characteristics ( ikt h ) include the grant offer a firm expects to receive in that region. 
We estimate firms’ location choice using a conditional logit model:  
( )
( ) ￿ + + + +
+ + + +
= =
k
ikt jkt ikt kt
ikt jkt ikt kt
ikt e p h z






) 1 ( Pr
b b b a
b b b a
.        (4) 
We model grants as a lump sum payment to the firm. The RSA rules (discussed later in 
more detail) stipulate that firms can only apply for a grant in one region and that the project 
must be marginal, in the sense that it would not otherwise take place in that location; we 
assume that these conditions hold for all firms. We assume that there is some cost (c) of 
applying for a grant so that firms only apply if there is some positive expectation of receiving 
an offer.  
We denote whether and where firm i applies for a grant in region m as  1 = im A . The firm 
would apply in region m rather than n if 
in in in im im im c g E c g E - + P > - + P ) ( ) (             (5) 
where  ) ( ik g E  is the expected grant in region k. If (5) holds for all n=1 ... K, then the firm 
applies for a grant in m if net profits are greater in region m than in all other regions, n:   9
otherwise.      0
    ) (   if      1
=
„ " P > - + P = n m c g E A in in im im im           (6) 
The policy maker decides whether or not to award a grant. Denote  im O  as an indicator 
variable of whether a firm is offered a grant in m: 
. 0   if     0







                  (7) 
The firm then decides whether to accept the offer, and locate in m, or not accept the offer, 
in which case it locates in n.
9  Denote  im T  as an indicator variable of whether a firm takes 
up an offer:
10 
otherwise.      0
  if      1
=
P > + P = in im im im g T
                (8) 
We want to model the location choice of the firm. The unconditional probability of firm i 
locating in region m,  ) 1 ( = im y P , is the product of the conditional probability that the firm 
takes up a grant offer, the conditional probability the firm receives a grant offer and the 
probability of making an application to m, 
) 1 ( ) 1 1 ( ) 1   and   1 1 ( ) 1 ( = ￿ = = O ￿ = = O = = = im im im im im im i im i A P A P A T P y P .   (9) 
The model is depicted in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Our aim is to investigate the role of grants in location choice. Specifically, we would like to 
estimate a conditional logit model of firm location and include as an explanatory variable the 
                                                 
9 A firm could also choose not to set up. We do not consider this possibility here. 
10 Note that at this stage, the cost of application is sunk.   10
expected grant available to each firm in each location, conditional on making an application 
in that location:  ) 1 ( = im im A g E . That is, we would like to include the amount of grant each 
firm would expect to get if it applied to that region. 
To estimate this directly would require data on unsuccessful applications as well as offers 
made, but unfortunately such data is not available. We observe where each plant locates, 
and we also observe all grant offers (in excess of £75,000). We are able to match data on 
grant offers with data on plants in cases where the firm accepts the offer (though not in cases 
where an offer is made but not taken up). We do not observe whether a firm applies for a 
grant. 
This leaves us with a number of difficulties to do with identification and selection. In order to 
identify the impact of the grant we need exogenous variation in the grant offers made and 
taken up. We also need to be able to estimate the level of grant offer each firm would 
expect to get in each region. We identify the expected grant using industry and firm 
characteristics. These do not enter the location choice model, but they may affect the firm’s 
probability of receiving a grant offer, and the amount it gets offered. Thus we identify the 
expected grant from: 
•  differences between domestic and foreign firms: we assume that the distribution of 
domestic projects is the same as foreign ones, conditional on observables, in their 
sensitivity to subsidy through the grant, but allow policy makers to favour foreign 
firms;  
•  industry differences in grant offers: we assume that projects are the same across 
industries, conditional on observables, in the externalities they get from 
agglomerations and their sensitivity to subsidy through the grant, but allow policy 
makers to favour some industries over others; 
•  differences between marginal and non-marginal projects: we assume that marginal 
projects are the same as non-marginal ones, conditional on observables, in the   11
externalities they get from agglomerations and their sensitivity to subsidy through the 
grant, but allow policy makers to favour marginal projects over infra marginal 
projects (e.g. in terms of cost-effectiveness or for political reasons). 
We estimate the grant equation in two ways, both of which are biased, but in opposite 
directions. We use the following estimates of the expected grant in place of  ) 1 ( = im im A g E : 
(A) Using only the data on grant offers we estimate the expected grant conditional on 
applying and being made an offer. Explanatory variables include industry and regional 
characteristics, but not firm level data. In addition, this is a selected sample. Estimation 
should allow for the fact that only firms that receive offers are included in the observations 
used.  We do not observe unsuccessful applications at the individual plant level, and so we 
cannot correct for this. However, the probability of receiving an offer on average, 
conditional on applying, is high at around 89 percent.
11 We estimate 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 | 1 / 1 | 1 , 1 | = = O = = = = O im im im im im im im A P A g E A g E                (10) 
which provides an overestimate of  ) 1 ( = im im A g E . 
(B) Using grants offers matched to plant level data we estimate the unconditional expected 
value of the grant using a Tobit model based on all firm observations,  
  ) 1 ( * ) 1   , 1   , 1 ( = = O = = = O = im im im im im im im A T P A T g E .                 (11) 
This is an underestimate of the variable  ) 1 ( = im im A g E , since it is based on an 
unconditional probability. Using this method of estimating the expected grant we can 
condition on firm level variables, unlike above in (A). 
                                                 
11 PA Cambridge Economic Consultants (1993), Table 2.1 shows that over the period 1985-1988 there were 7953 
applications, 1513 were then withdrawn and 5732 offers were made.   12
We have no direct empirical evidence on which of these approaches yields the best estimate 
of  ) 1 ( = im im A g E . However, from aggregate data it is clear that the vast majority of firms 
do not apply for a grant in any region. The size of the underestimate in (B) is therefore likely 
to be large. By contrast, a high proportion of applications made result in offers. Of course 
firms may anticipate this and not apply if their probability is low. However, we believe that 
the overestimate in (A) is likely to be smaller (although subject to selection bias).  
3  Data 
Our data comes from two main sources. We use information on all production plants in 
Great Britain over the period 1986 to 1992 taken from the Annual Respondents Database 
(ARD) in order to identify entrants and where they locate. Our second data source is the list 
of all grant offers of £75,000 or more that is maintained by the Department of Trade and 
Industry.  
3.1  Plant location data 
The Annual Respondents Database (ARD) data contains basic information on all production 
plants located in Great Britain. Detailed information on inputs and outputs is collected at the 
establishment level, which can either be a single plant or a group of plants. We use the data 
at the plant level and identify greenfield entrants from the population of plants in each year 
over the period 1986 to 1992. Along with the year of entry we also have information on the 
entrant’s industry, the nationality of the parent company, the group structure, and 
employment. We can therefore distinguish between new plants that are owned by foreign 
multinationals and those that are UK-owned, and between those that are part of an existing 
firm and those new plants that are not part of a group, and are therefore new firms.   13
We consider firms’ location choices at the level of the 64 counties and Scottish regions
12 
within Great Britain, 38 of which include an Assisted Area. Figure B1 in appendix B shows 
a map of counties and Scottish regions. This generates 102 potential location choices for 
each plant. We use the employment information in the ARD population to calculate a 
measure of the size of each of these location choice areas. 
To provide a description of the data we use the ten administrative regions of Great Britain 
and again distinguish between Assisted and non-Assisted Areas within these regions. Figure 
B2 in appendix B shows a map of the ten administrative regions. The South East of England 
and East Anglia had no areas classified as Assisted during this period, creating 18 regions in 
total. The distribution of entrants over regions is shown in Table 1. The first column shows 
the distribution of all plants. The second column shows the distribution of all entrants, the 
third shows the distribution of new entrant plants owned by foreign-multinationals and the 
fourth shows the distribution of new plants set up by UK-owned groups. The distribution of 
new plants varies over regions and over time. It is similar to the distribution of the population 
of all plants. On average over a third of all new plants each year locate in the South East of 
England. Wales and Scotland account for around 10% of new plants over the period, but 
more new plants locate in Assisted Areas than in non-Assisted Areas within these regions.
13 
The majority of new entrants are single plants that are not part of existing firms: new plants 
owned by foreign multinationals and UK groups make up approximately 17% of new 
entrants each year in terms of number of plants. They are however larger so make up a 
much more substantial portion of jobs in new plants. The regional distribution differs for new 
plants owned by foreign-multinationals, with a higher proportion locating in Scotland and 
Wales than for all new plants. The distribution of new entrants over counties is shown in 
Table B1 in Appendix B. 
                                                 
12 For brevity we refer to both the counties of England and Wales and the Regions of Scotland as counties.  
13 The size of Assisted Areas varies by region, as does the extent to which they are located in urban and more rural 
areas.    14
[Table 1 here] 
Measures of co-location externalities 
We use the ARD to construct a number of measures that will be used in estimation. First, in 
order to investigate the importance of co-location economies we include measures to 
capture both industry agglomeration externalities and diversification externalities.  
Our measures of industry agglomeration externalities are: (i) the number of plants in each 
industry in each county-year; and (ii) the number of foreign-owned plants in each industry in 
each county-year. These are calculated at the 4-digit industry level, and for each of the 64 
counties.
14 We also calculate a measure of  industry agglomeration
15 denoted 
MS g , that 
measures the extent of industry geographic concentration conditional on industrial 
concentration in the industry, and also taking into account the underlying geographic 
distribution of manufacturing activity. We use this measure calculated at the 4-digit industry 
level to differentiate between more and less agglomerated industries. This index varies 
between –1 and +1, with higher values indicating more agglomerated industries.  
We measure the extent of diversification externalities using a locational Herfindahl index, 
calculated using employment shares of 4 -digit industries for each county in each year, 
excluding a plant’s own industry. We subtract this measure from 1, producing an index that 
varies between 0 and 1, the higher the value of the index, the more diverse is a county’s 
industrial structure.  
Table B2 in appendix B shows the mean values for each of these variables across the 64 
countries. Table 2 summarises these values by showing the value for each county averaged 
                                                 
14 We also experimented with using the proportion of total industry plants in each county-year and the proportion 
of total industry foreign-owned plants in each county-year. Using these measures does not change the overall 
pattern on results. 
15 For information on this measure see Maurel and Sédillot (1999) and Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2002) who 
implement the measure on UK data, as used in this paper.   15
across the 10 administrative regions. The mean values in these tables are calculated across 
the dataset of entrants and possible location choices used in the conditional logit model in 
section 4.1. The mean value of the industry agglomeration measures is highest in the South 
East of England – on average an entrant in our data choosing whether to locate in the South 
East would observe 70 existing plants in a county in the South East its own industry. But not 
all industries are geographically concentrated in the South East. Indeed some of the most 
agglomerated industries such as cutlery, lace and hosiery are geographically concentrated 
outside of the South East, in Yorkshire and in the East Midlands. Examples of agglomerated 
industries, as measured by 
MS g , include the ceramics industry where 47% of plants and 
35% of new entrants are located in Staffordshire (
MS g = 0.471), and publishing of journals 
and magazines where 47% of plants and 45% of new entrants are located in Greater 
London (
MS g = 0.237). The most diversified counties are those centred around major cities 
such as Greater Manchester and Greater London, and the three least diversified areas are 
the Island Authorities, Borders and Highland Scottish regions. 
[Table 2 here] 
Measures of wages 
We construct measures of wages for both skilled (Administrative, Technical and Clerical, 
ATC) workers and unskilled workers (Operatives, OPS) at the 2-digit industry-county 
level. To construct these measures we use the establishment-level ARD sample over the 
period 1985 to 1992, and gross up using sampling weights. Wages are then expressed in 
real terms in 1990 £. 
3.2  Regional Selective Assistance data 
Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) grants can be paid to both new entrants and existing 
firms within designated ‘Assisted Areas’. These are areas designated as needing investment   16
to re-vitalise their economies, are areas of high unemployment, and are areas in which 
regional aid may be granted under EU law.  
The RSA scheme is primarily aimed at creating and safeguarding jobs, but other objectives 
include attracting internationally mobile investment.
16 It is a major form of financial incentive 
currently available to both inward and domestic investors. Grants are awarded to companies 
opening a new plant, or expanding or modernising an existing plant. Grants are available of 
up to 15% of eligible project costs, including plant and machinery, land, site preparation and 
buildings. For a grant to be awarded it must be demonstrated that the project would not go 
ahead in the planned form without the grant. The amount of the grant offered depends on the 
area, the needs of the project, the number of jobs safeguarded or created, and the impact 
the project will have on the economy, (job displacement elsewhere is taken into 
consideration). However the amount eventually negotiated will normally be the minimum 
amount necessary for the project to go ahead in the proposed form.  
[Table 3 and Figure 2 here] 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the value of grant offers across counties, and Table 3 
shows the generosity of grant offers across Assisted Areas in the ten administrative regions 
of Great Britain. Plants located in Scotland, Wales and the Northern region of England 
received the highest total value of grant offers over the period 1986 to 1992. The highest 
average grant offers were made in Scotland. The distribution of grant offers can be 
compared to the county level agglomeration and diversification measures described above in 
Tables 2 and B2. A number of the areas where industry agglomerations are highest, for 
example in counties in the South East of England, do not receive any grant offers. But in 
other cases, such as in the North West, the two coincide to a greater extent. On average our 
                                                 
16 See PA Cambridge Economic Consultants (1993) and Arup Economics and Planning (2000). See discussion in 
Swales (1997) and the “ambiguity over the official rationale for UK regional policy and the RSA in particular.” 
Also see Harris and Robinson (2002) for a survey of current industrial support policies in Britain.    17
measures of agglomeration and diversification are lower in Assisted Areas where grant 
offers can be made, compared to non-Assisted Areas. 
In these data, between 1986 and 1992 over 90% of grants, by value, were given to firms in 
production industries. The industries receiving the highest values of grants were the motor 
vehicles, radio, TV and communication, machinery and equipment, chemicals and food and 
drinks industries. 
3.3  Matched plant location and grant data 
We match the ARD data on plant locations to information on all individual RSA grant offers 
of £75,000 or more made between 1986 and 1992 in England, Wales and Scotland. Over 
this period we have data on over 2,000 grant offers which includes the name of the firm 
receiving the grant offer, the postcode of the plant which receives the offer, its industry, the 
amount of the offer, and the year the offer was received. We match the data at the plant 
level using the postcode and industry information.  
[Table 4 here] 
The resulting dataset contains information on over 120,000 new plants set up in Great 
Britain, over 20,000 of which are part of existing UK or foreign-owned firms. We match 
347 grant offers to new entrants.
17 Table 4 shows the total number of entrants split into 
domestic and foreign-owned categories. In the second row we show the number of entrants 
in Assisted Areas. The proportion of entrants going to Assisted Areas is similar across 
types. The third row uses the matched grant offers and shows the proportion of entrants in 
our sample that we observe receiving and taking up grant offers, by ownership category, 
between 1986 and 1992. A higher proportion of foreign-owned entrants received and took 
up a grant offer. On average foreign-owned entrants received larger grant offers than either 
                                                 
17 We distinguish grant offers that match to new entrants, from those that match to existing plants.   18
class of domestic entrants (although this may be due to their larger size). Finally, in the last 
row of the table, we show that the average grant offer received by entrants is also highest for 
those that are part of foreign-owned multinationals. More details of the way the plant level 
data are matched to the grant offers data are given in Appendix A. 
4  Empirical results 
In this section we first describe the results of estimating the expected grant for each of the 
two options described above. We then investigate the effects of co-location externalities on 
the location choices of new plants that are either part of existing UK groups or part of 
foreign-owned multinationals. Finally we examine the effects of grants on location choices, 
conditional on co-location externalities. 
4.1  Expected grant 
As described in section 2, we take two approaches to measuring the expected grant. Under 
option (A) we regress data on all grant offers over the period 1986 to 1992 on broad 
industry groups  j h and region dummies  k RR  and the local authority unemployment rate 
kt unemp . 
( ) k kt j ijkt RR unemp F g , , h =                       (12A) 
Under option (B) we jointly estimate whether a firm applies for a grant, whether it gets an 
offer and how much it is offered. We use data on all entrants (both those within and outside 
of Assisted Areas, and all ownership types). We exclude plants where we are not sure if 
they received an offer.
18 As our data is truncated, (we do not observe offers below 
£75,000), we use a tobit. Our model is of the form: 
                                                 
18 The grant offer data is matched to the ARD on postcode and industry (4-digit sic92). Plants that definitely 
match are those where both the postcode and industry code match. Plants that definitely do not match are those   19
( ) ( ) k kt it it j ik RR unemp group for F g , , , , ln h =                 (12B) 
where  1 = it for  is a dummy variable indicating whether the plant is foreign-owned, and 
1 = it group  is a dummy variable indicating whether the plant is part of a group. 
The parameters in the models reflect the policy stance. The level of offers varies in England, 
Scotland and Wales. The amount of grant offered also varies with local economic 
conditions, reflected here by the unemployment rate. Grant offers are also linked to jobs 
created and capital expenditure undertaken; however we only include information on plant 
characteristics in their first year of entry (such as their ownership status), as receipt of an 
offer would be expected to affect investment and employment behaviour in subsequent 
periods (we do not observed planned expenditures). Table 5 shows the estimation results of 
each option. 
[Table 5 here] 
Column (A) indicates significant variation in grant offers across industries and regions. The 
unemployment rate is not significant. Note that grant offers can only made in Assisted Areas. 
This result implies only that the differences in unemployment rates between Assisted Areas 
do not affect grant offers. In column (B), higher grant offers are made to firms in areas of 
higher unemployment, that are part of existing groups, that apply in Wales or Scotland and 
those in some industries. In this case, unemployment reflects differences between Assisted 
Areas and non-Assisted areas. Since high unemployment is an important factor in 
determining Assisted Areas (and hence grant offers), it is not surprisingly that unemployment 
is significant. 
                                                                                                                                            
were the postcode does not appear in the grant offer data. Plants where we are not sure are those were the 
postcode appears in the grants data, but the industry code does not match (and that grant offer is not matched to 
another plant). Plants in this final category are excluded from the estimation of the predicted grant but are included 
in the models estimated in the next section.   20
We use the estimated parameters from each of the options to obtain an expected grant for 
each entrant in each location. For option (A) the expected grant varies across broad 
industries, over broad regions, and within that across counties (the geographic unit on which 
possible locations in our conditional logit model are based) and time (because the 
unemployment rate varies by local authority and over time). For option (B) the expected 
grant additionally varies with firm characteristics (group and foreign-ownership dummies). 
We set the expected grant to zero outside Assisted Areas. 
Using the results from Table 5, Table 6a shows the expected grant offers for England, 
Wales and Scotland for each option, and compares them with actual offers observed for 
these regions. Table 6b does the same, comparing between domestic-owned and foreign-
owned firms. Recall that the expected grant in option A is based on data on grant offers, and 
so the expected grant is conditional on a firm having applied for a grant (but not necessarily 
accepting it). By contrast, option B uses data on all entrants, whether or not they apply for 
or receive a grant. In the notation in the Tables,  [ ]
*
ijkt g E  is the unconditional expected grant 
for any entrant i across all possible regions k.  [ ] ijkt g E  is the expected grant for firm i 
conditional on that firm actually receiving a grant, (above £75,000). It is  [ ]
*
ijkt g E  which is 
used in estimation in Table 9.  
There is to some extent a trade-off between option (A) which predicts the distribution 
across regions well and options (B) which uses information on whether plants are part of 
groups and whether they are foreign-owned, and hence gives a better prediction of the 
difference in the level of grant typically received by foreign and domestic-owned plants. 
[Table 6A and 6B here] 
4.2  Location choice 
We now turn to the location choice model. We estimate the model on new plants that are 
part of foreign-owned multinationals or are set up by existing UK manufacturing groups over   21
the period 1986 to 1992. We consider these plants on the grounds that their mobility is 
likely to be high. These new entrants choose between 102 geographic locations, defined 
from the 64 counties that are then split further into Assisted and non-Assisted Areas, if they 
contain areas eligible for support under the RSA scheme.  
The dependent variable takes a value of 1 in the area the new entrant chose to locate. We 
investigate the effects of a number of factors on location choice. First, we include measures 
to capture the extent of industry agglomeration, and investigate separately the hypothesis that 
foreign-owned plants choose to locate in the vicinity of other foreign-owned firms (as has 
been found in the literature). We would expect the industry agglomeration measures to have 
a positive effect on the probability of location if firms benefit from externalities, for example 
in the form of cheaper inputs, that lead to lower costs and higher profits in these locations. 
But it is possible that there is a non-linear relationship between the probability of location 
and the extent of industry agglomeration in a region, if high levels of agglomeration mean that 
prices of immobile factors are driven up or there are congestion costs that induce plants to 
locate elsewhere. Second, we investigate the effects of fiscal incentives. Finally we 
investigate the interaction between fiscal incentives and the extent of industry agglomeration. 
We include the size of each of the 102 location choices, measured by total manufacturing 
employment. It might be expected that locating near to a larger proportion of your 
customers reduces transport costs, however it is possible, as discussed above, that 
congestion effects may set in. We also include the measure of county diversity, and our 2-
digit industry-county level measures of wages. From the theoretical argument above greater 
diversity might be expected to have a positive effect on profits and the probability that a 
plant chooses to locate in a particular region. The agglomeration measures are calculated at 
the level of the 64 counties, so this means for example that Assisted-Areas in Tyne-and-
Wear and non-Assisted Areas in Tyne-and-Wear have the same agglomeration and 
diversity measures. These are all entered with a one-year lag.   22
We estimate a fixed effects conditional logit model. The estimation results are reported in 
Tables 7, 8 and 9.  The numbers reported in Tables 7 and 9 are the log-odds ratio from the 
conditional logit model. Numbers greater than 1 indicate that the variable has a positive 
effect on the probability of location. Numbers less than 1 indicate that the variable has a 
negative effect on the probability of location. T-statistics are given in brackets. We present 
elasticities for the Table 7 final column specification in Table 8. 
[Table 7 here] 
In column (1) of Table 7 we estimate the model with only the measure of the size of each 
area, the 2 -digit industry-county measures of wages and county dummies for the 64 
counties. As suggested above we find that area size has a positive effect on the probability 
of location. In this specification a higher level of industry wages for both skilled workers 
(ATC) and unskilled workers (OPS) appears to have a positive effect on the probability of 
location. However once we include our measures of agglomeration and diversification we 
find a positive relationship between the probability of location and skilled wages and a 
negative relationship between the probability of location and unskilled wages. Reasons why 
wages might vary across regions include productivity differences and differences in costs of 
living, which have not been accounted for in our measures. A positive relationship between 
the probability of location and skilled wages may therefore indicate productivity differences 
across regions  – firms being attracted to regions where the marginal product of skilled 
workers is higher. 
In column (2) we include the one-year lags of the 4-digit industry agglomeration measure in 
an attempt to capture the extent of agglomeration in the firm's industry prior to the decision 
to invest. Industry agglomeration externalities appear to create incentives for plants within 
the same industry to co-locate. The number of plants in the county in the firm's industry, has 
a positive effect on the probability of locating there. Column (3) shows that the number of 
foreign-owned plants in the 4-digit industry in the county also has a positive effect on the 
probability of location. In addition we investigate whether a greater foreign presence makes   23
a location even more attractive for new-entrants that are part of foreign-owned 
multinationals compared to those that are part of UK groups. We interact the number of 
foreign-owned plants measure with a dummy that takes the value of 1 for new entrants that 
are part of foreign-owned multinationals. Similar to other studies we find that foreign-owned 
entrants appear to value the geographic proximity of other foreign-owed activity. The 
inclusion of the agglomeration measures does not affect the log-odds ratios on the area size 
variable, although the inclusion of the foreign-agglomeration measures reduces the 
significance of the overall industry agglomeration measure. 
In column (4) we include the Herfindahl diversity  measure in an attempt to capture the 
effects of ‘Jacobs’ diversity externalities between plants across industries. The higher is the 
value of this index, the more diverse is a county’s industrial structure. The log-odds ratio 
indicates that new entrants are attracted to more diverse regions. Finally in column (5) we 
examine whether, as we might expect, agglomeration effects are stronger for new entrants to 
more agglomerated industries, that is industries where activity is more geographically 
concentrated as measured by our industry agglomeration measure 
MS g . This is supported 
by the data. We interact the number of plants in the county in the firm's industry with the 
industry-level agglomeration measure 
MS g , and find that the previous positive effect of the 
number of plants in the county in the firm’s industry was being driven by the geographic 
distribution of new entrants in more agglomerated industries – large numbers of plants have a 
stronger effect on firms’ location choices in more agglomerated industries. 
In Table 8 we report elasticities for this final specification. The elasticities for the 
agglomeration measures are very low. For example, at the mean, increasing the number of 
foreign-owned plants in a county by one increases the probability of location there by 
0.00012, implying an elasticity of 0.008. The responsiveness of location choice to the 
number of foreign presence increases for foreign-owned new entrants.  
[Table 8 here]   24
Table 9 investigates the effect of fiscal incentives. In the first column we simply include a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the location choice is an Assisted Area. Our prior 
expectation is that the log-odds ratio on this dummy variable would be less than one, 
because these areas are designated as Assisted on the basis of their economic status. As can 
be seen the log-odds ratio is less than one but is insignificant, perhaps indicating that there is 
something attracting more new activity to these areas than would otherwise be expected. 
In columns (2) and (4) we include our two measures of the expected grant. First in column 
(2) we include the expected grant from option (A). The expected grant has a positive and 
significant (at the 10% level) impact on the probability of location, and the effect of the 
Assisted Area dummy is now negative and significant. Grants appear to explain some of the 
attractiveness of Assisted Areas. This finding is supported by the results in column (4) for 
option (B). Here we find a positive and more strongly significant effect of the expected grant 
on the probability of location. 
[Table 9 here] 
We can use the results from column (2) and column (4) to provide an indication of the effect 
of grants on location. The elasticity of location with respect to the expected grant offer from 
column (2) at the mean is 0.04; that is, a 1% increase in the expected grant offer increases 
the probability of location by 0.04%. To achieve a 1% increase in the probability of location 
in particular would imply an increase in the average expected grant offer of around 
£100,000. The estimates from column (4) imply that a 1% increase in the unconditional 
expected grant leads to a 0.13% increase in the probability of location.  
Finally we investigate further whether the responsiveness of new entrants to fiscal incentives 
is affected by the extent of industry agglomeration. Counties that contained Assisted Areas 
typically have lower values of our county-industry agglomeration measures, and it might be 
expected that new entrants to more agglomerated industries might be less responsive to 
fiscal incentives to induce them to locate away from existing agglomerations. For both 
methods of estimating the expected grant, we interact the expected grant measure with 
MS g .   25
The results are shown in columns (3) and (5) of Table 9. They are insignificant (a the 5% 
level); we do not find any strong difference between the responsiveness of new entrants in 
more and less agglomerated industries to a given level of expected grant. We experimented 
with splitting the sample by the extent of industry agglomeration 
MS g , and found some 
evidence that the expected grant no longer has a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of location for new entrants in the most agglomerated industries. But it is also the 
case that plants in the most agglomerated industries receive lower grant offers. Indeed the 
high-tech industries that received the highest grants are not among the most agglomerated. 
5  Conclusions 
This paper investigates the determinants of the location of new plant start-ups in Great 
Britain. This model is based on the assumption of plant mobility: a firm will choose the most 
profitable location for its new plant. In particular we investigate two factors potentially 
affecting the choice of location: (i) the presence of spillover effects from being located near 
to other plants in the same industry, or in a diversified region, and (ii) the impact of 
discretionary regional grants aimed at inducing new plants to locate in Assisted Areas, which 
are designated for such assistance based on their economic characteristics.  
We use data on the location and other characteristics of 18,000 new plants from the ARD 
dataset over the period 1986-1992. We choose those plants that appear a priori to be more 
mobile: plants owned by existing firms, whether foreign or domestic. We also use data on all 
grant offers made over the same period and we are able to match a subset of these to new 
entrants in the ARD data. To identify the impact of discretionary grants on location choice, 
we would like to estimate the grant that a firm could expect to receive if it chose to locate in 
a particular region, conditional on having made an application for grant in that region. 
However, we do not observe this. Instead we follow two routes. We estimate the expected 
grant for a firm conditional on being made an offer in a region, and we estimate the 
unconditional expected grant for a firm in each region. We use these estimates of the 
expected grant in a fixed effects conditional logit model of location choice.   26
Our findings are of interest in the context of government policies concerned with regional 
variation in economic performance. We find that industry agglomeration effects play a role in 
location choice. Plants in more agglomerated industries choose to locate near to other plants 
within the same industry. New foreign-owned plants choose to locate near to other foreign-
owned plants within the same industry. Our results therefore point to the existing geographic 
distribution of industries as being an important determinant of new plant location. Regional 
Selective Assistance grants are found to have a significant effect in attracting plants to 
specific locations. However, the effect is small. The estimated elasticity of the probability of 
choosing to locate in a particular region with respect to the expected grant offer ranges from 
0.04 to 0.13. Taken together, our findings suggest that, to the extent that regional grants are 
effective in inducing firms to locate in particular areas, they may bring further dynamic 
benefits to those regions by increasing the probability that subsequent new plants locate 
there.   27
Appendix A 
This section contains further information on the procedure for matching the RSA grants data 
to the ARD data. 
The postcode information in the ARD data runs from 1985 onwards. As our analysis looks 
at entrants over the period 1986 to 1992, and as we only allow matches to plants either 
present in the year the grant is offered or that appear in the data up to 3 years after the offer 
is made we match the grant offers data from 1983 to 1992. Grants are matched to the 
population of plants on postcode and 4-digit industry. The grant offers data contains sic92 
industry codes. For the period 1983-1991, a sic80-sic92 mapping is used (up to 15 
mappings for each sic80) to adjust the ARD data, and for the period after 1991, sic92 
codes in the ARD are used. For grants that match on both postcode and industry, any 
multiple matches are reduced as follows. Any multiple matches to the same enterprise group 
are all accepted. Matches are eliminated by ranking them according to the most likely 
industry code mapping where possible. The match closest to the year the grant is awarded is 
accepted.  
Table A1 shows the proportion of grants we can match to the ARD population in for each 
year of the data on grant offers. We match around 50% of grants both in value and number. 
These matches are to both existing plants and new entrants. In our analysis we use only 
those matched to entrants. Plants in Scotland, Wales and the North region of England 
received the highest values of offers over the period. The South East and East Anglia did not 
contain significant areas classified as Assisted until 1993. Figure 2 also shows the 
geographic distribution of the value of grant offers over the period 1986 to 1992.  
[Table A1 here] 
   28
Appendix B 
[Figures B1 and B2 here] 
Tables at county level 
[Table B1 and B2 here]   29
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Figure 2: Distribution of grant offers by value 1985-1992  
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Table 1: Regional distribution of production plants and entrants, 1986-1992  




    All  Foreign  UK group 
Assisted         
South East  -  -  -  - 
East Anglia  -  -  -  - 
South West  0.8  0.8  1.3  0.9 
West Midlands  10.0  9.1  9.3  9.0 
East Midlands  0.6  0.6 
a  0.7 
Yorkshire and Humberside  4.3  3.8  3.9  4.6 
North West  7.6  7.1  6.5  7.0 
North  3.0  3.0  4.4  3.5 
Wales  3.4  3.6  5.4  3.8 
Scotland  4.1  3.9  6.3  4.2 
         
Unassisted         
South East  34.8  39.5  37.3  33.4 
East Anglia  3.5  3.4  3.5  4.2 
South West  6.1  5.6  5.4  7.1 
West Midlands  3.0  2.7  2.5  3.1 
East Midlands  8.2  7.4  6.5  7.9 
Yorkshire and Humberside  4.3  3.7  3.8  4.5 
North West  3.5  3.2  4.7  3.4 
North  0.6  0.4 
a  0.6 
Wales  0.4  0.4 
a  0.4 
Scotland  2.1  2.0  3.3  2.6 
Excludes entrants that are not yet in production. All figures are annual averages. Table B1 in Appendix B 
shows the distribution of new entrants across counties and Scottish regions. 
a Figure cannot be disclosed for 
data confidentiality reasons. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics: mean values 1986-1992* 
Region  Diversity 
measure 
Agglomeration measures, number of 4-digit 
industry: 
    Plants  Foreign plants 
South East  0.845  70  1 
East Anglia  0.891  24  1 
South West  0.838  21  1 
West Midlands  0.866  52  1 
East Midlands  0.876  32  1 
Yorkshire and Humberside  0.889  39  1 
North West  0.920  53  1 
Northern  0.764  12  0 
Wales  0.739  9  0 
Scotland  0.655  11  0 
Mean  0.805  31  1 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the ARD (Source: ONS).  
* Note: Agglomeration measures are calculated for each of 64 counties at the 4 -digit-industry-year level. 
Diversity measure is calculated at the county-year level. Figures in column (1) are averages over counties 
and years within region. Figures in columns (2) and (3) are averages over industries, counties and years 
within region. The averages are calculated across the dataset of entrants and possible location choices used 
in the conditional logit model in section 4.1. Measures at the county level are shown in table B2, Appendix 
B.   5 
Table 3: RSA Grants – Regional distribution, 1986-1992 
Region  Number grant offers  Total grant offers  
(£ million 1990) 
Average grant offer 
(£1990) 
       
England       
South East  -  -  - 
East Anglia  -  -  - 
South West  80  27  332,659 
West Midlands  339  121  358,404 
East Midlands  28  4  155,403 
Yorkshire and Humberside  163  75  459,529 
North West  348  157  452,093 
Northern  365  243  665,200 
Wales  442  273  618,053 
Scotland  673  460  683,519 
Note: No areas in the South East of England and East Anglia were classified as assisted during this period. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using RSA grant offers data. The total number of grants in this table does not 







Table 4: New entrant grant offer recipients by ownership nationality, 1986-1992 





Total number of entrants  121,583  100,981  19,116  1,486 
Total number of entrants in Assisted 
Areas 
38,583  31,738  6,336  509 
% entrants in Assisted Areas receiving 
grant offers 
a 
0.9  0.6  2.0  3.3 
Average grant offer to entrants 
(£1990) 
445,921  413,712  442,830  866,339 
a Authors’ calculations using our sample of RSA grants matched to entrants in the ARD (Source: ONS). See 
Appendix A for more details. The proportion of entrants receiving grants will be an understatement as we 
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Table 5: Grant offer regression 
Estimation option  Option (A)  Option (B) 
Dependent variable   real grant offer (£1990)  real grant offer (£1990) 
Observations  2120  77,253 
No. grant offers  2120  312 
Unemployment rate  1033550  5056584 
  (0.50)  (4.77) 
Group  -  289950 
    (4.99) 
Foreign-owned  -  296261 
    (1.90) 
West Midlands  39812  914971 
  (0.44)  (7.64) 
East Midlands  -145141  411683 
  (-1.41)  (2.54) 
Yorkshire and Humberside  250280  709809 
  (2.01)  (5.19) 
North West  201226  908007 
  (2.14)  (7.48) 
Northern  401832  1430305 
  (2.38)  (10.46) 
Wales  256559  1566227 
  (3.35)  (11.54) 
Scotland  370288  1403515 
  (3.11)  (10.79) 
Wales*Foreign-owned  -  -57951 
    (-0.16) 
Scotland*Foreign-owned  -  83670 
    (0.28) 
FdTx  176321  889795 
  (1.37)  (2.29) 
ChRu  351039  1438069 
  (2.35)  (3.67) 
Metl  132365  836435 
  (1.01)  (2.16) 
HiTc  854134  1238219 
  (4.00)  (3.15) 
Motr  1058346  1446148 
  (2.76)  (3.57) 
Othr  191027  982575 
  (1.46)  (2.54) 
Constant  -125762  -5443022 
  (-0.58)  (-11.19) 
Year dummies  No  Yes 
Note: Industry dummies are defined as: FdTx (manufacture of food, drink, textiles, wearing apparel, and 
leather goods); ChRu (chemicals and rubber and plastic); Metl (other non-metallic mineral products, basic 
metals, fabricated metal products); HiTc (office machinery computers, electrical machinery n.e.c., radio tv 
communications, medical optical instruments); Motr (motor vehicles and other transp equipment); Othr 
(machinery and equip n.e.c., publishing, furniture and manuf n.e.c., wood and wood products, paper and 
paper products). Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
Source: authors’ calculations using RSA grant offers data and the ARD (Source: ONS). 
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Table 6A: Expected grant offer 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  England-Assisted  Wales-Assisted  Scotland-Assisted 
       
Actual mean grant  
(all grants £1990) 
403,881  618,053  683,519 
       
Actual mean grant 
(good matches to 
entrants £1990) 
388,372  463,298  571,759 
       
Option (A)  345,053  475,575  595,490 
       
Option (B)  [ ]
*
ijkt g E   5,048  17,103  13,678 
       
Option (B)  [ ] ijkt g E    461,032  536,571  522,770 
       
Notes: Figures shown here are means within each region. The expected grants used in the conditional 
logit estimation in tables 7 and 8 varies at the more dis-aggregated county-assisted area level.  




Table 6B: Expected grant offer  
  (1)  (2) 
  Domestic-owned  Foreign-owned 
Actual g  





     
Option (A)  414,983  505,226 
     
Option (B)  [ ]
*
ijkt g E   8,339  18,443 
     
Option (B)  [ ] ijkt g E    484,995  525,125 
     
Source: Authors’ calculations using RSA grant offers data and the ARD (Source: ONS), and PA 
Cambridge Economic Consultants (1993). 
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Table 7: Location choice model: new plants owned by a foreign multinational and 
UK groups, log-odds ratios 
  Dependent variable:  ijkt Y  = 1 if entrant chooses region k, 0 
otherwise 
1,840,590 Obs  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
(5) 
           
Area size  t-1  1.000016  1.000016  1.000016  1.000016  1.000016 
(manufacturing employment)  (48.41)  (48.20)  (48.17)  (48.17)  (48.21) 
Industry wage OPS t-1  1.000091  1.000012  0.999  0.999  0.999 
  (13.47)  (1.59)  (-2.40)  (-2.51)  (-4.83) 
Industry wage ATC t-1  1.000057  1.00004  1.000027  1.000027  1.000029 
  (9.29)  (6.33)  (4.09)  (4.07)  (4.45) 
Agglomeration measures, number of:     
Industry plants  t –1    1.000603  1.000065  1.000087  0.999 
    (27.52)  (1.69)  (2.26)  (-1.53) 
Industry plants  t –1 * 
MS g    
      1.011 
          (13.76) 
Industry foreign-owned plants t –1      1.045  1.046  1.013 
      (16.97)  (17.03)  (3.77) 
Industry foreign-owned plants t –1      1.014  1.014  1.015 
* FO      (2.97)  (2.98)  (3.10) 
Diversity measure t –1        4.355  4.288 
        (26.96)  (26.68) 
           
County dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log likelihood  -71836  -71469  -71313  -70861  -70769 
Numbers in the table are log odds ratios, with z-ratios in parentheses. The sample includes 18,045 entrants 
in 1986-1992. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the ARD (Source: ONS). 
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Table 8: Location choice model: elasticities 
  Dependent variable:  ijkt Y  = 1 if entrant chooses region 
k, 0 otherwise 
1,840,590 Obs  Elasticities 
   
Area size (manufacturing employment) t –1  0.686 
   
Industry wage OPS t-1  -0.206 
   
Industry wage ATC t-1  0.212 
   
Agglomeration measures, number of:   
Industry plants  t-1  -0.002 
   
Industry plants  t-1 * 
MS g   0.010 
   
Industry foreign-owned plants t-1  0.008 
   
Industry foreign-owned plants t-1 * FO  0.011 
   
Diversity measure t-1  1.16 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the ARD (Source: ONS). 
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Table 9: Location choice model: log-odds ratios 
  Dependent variable:  ijkt Y  = 1 if entrant chooses region k, 0 
otherwise 
1,840,590 Obs  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Assisted Area  0.962  0.928  0.927  0.886  0.892 
  (-1.50)  (-2.25)  (-2.26)  (-4.29)  (-4.08) 
Expected grant (A)    1.000  1.000     
    (1.73)  (1.72)     
Expected grant (A) * 
MS g       1.000     
      (0.24)     
Expected grant (B)        1.000014  1.000014 
        (8.15)  (8.17) 
Expected grant (B) * 
MS g          
0.999 
          (-1.74) 
Area size  t-1  1.000016  1.000016  1.000016  1.000016  1.000016 
(manufacturing employment)   (48.02)  (47.21)  (47.17)  (46.94)  (46.96) 
Industry wage OPS t-1  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999 
  (-4.82)  (-4.82)  (-4.82)  (-4.91)  (-4.93) 
Industry wage ATC t-1  1.000029  1.000029  1.000029  1.000028  1.000028 
  (4.45)  (4.41)  (4.41)  (4.18)  (4.20) 
Agglomeration measures, number of:     
Industry plants  t-1  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999 
  (-1.53)  (-1.51)  (-1.52)  (-1.55)  (-1.37) 
Industry plants  t-1 * 
MS g   1.011  1.011  1.011  1.011  1.011 
  (13.76)  (13.75)  (13.68)  (13.66)  (13.31) 
Industry foreign-owned plants t-1  1.013  1.013  1.013  1.014  1.014 
  (3.77)  (3.75)  (3.75)  (3.89)  (3.94) 
Industry foreign-owned plants t-1  1.015  1.015  1.015  1.016  1.015 
* FO  (3.10)  (3.10)  (3.10)  (3.26)  (3.20) 
Diversity measure t-1  4.288  4.290  4.289  4.298  4.301 
  (26.68)  (26.68)  (26.68)  (26.72)  (26.74) 
           
County dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Log likelihood  -70769  -70767  -70767  -70737  -70736 
Numbers in the table are log odds ratios, with z-ratios in parentheses. The sample includes 18,045 entrants 
in 1986-1992. 

















Value of offers  
£m 
Value (%) of 
offers matched 
£m 
1983  227  108    (48%)  105.7  64.6  (61%) 
1984  224  119    (53%)  109.7  67.7  (62%) 
1985  275  167    (61%)  186.3  120.1  (64%) 
1986  310  164    (53%)  139.1  78.3  (56%) 
1987  340  192    (56%)  193.0  91.8  (48%) 
1988  366  202   (55%)  173.3  68.7  (40%) 
1989  383  223    (58%)  182.2  109.5  (60%) 
1990  357  168    (47%)  254.8  119.2  (47%) 
1991  348  169    (49%)  280.3  96.9  (35%) 
1992  369  175    (47%)  180.0  81.4  (45%) 
Total  3,199  1,687  (53%)  1,804.4  898.2  (50%) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using RSA grant offers data and the ARD (Source: ONS). 
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Table B1: Distribution of new entrants across counties, mean 1986-1992 








South East  34.8  39.5  37.3  33.4 
02 Bedfordshire  1.1  1.0    1.1 
03 Berkshire  1.5  1.7    1.6 
04 Buckinghamshire  1.5  1.6    1.5 
14 East Sussex  1.0  1.1    1.2 
15 Essex  2.7  2.8    2.5 
50 Greater London  15.4  19.7    13.3 
17 Hampshire  2.6  3.0    3.4 
19 Hertfordshire  2.2  2.2    2.2 
21 Isle of Wight  0.2  0.2    0.3 
22 Kent  2.3  2.3    2.5 
31 Oxfordshire  0.9  1.0    1.3 
36 Surrey  1.9  1.8    1.8 
38 West Sussex  1.3  1.3    1.5 
East Anglia  3.5  3.4  3.5  4.2 
05 Cambridgeshire  1.3  1.4    1.5 
26 Norfolk  1.1  1.0    1.4 
35 Suffolk  1.1  1.0    1.4 
South West  6.9  6.4    8.0 
01 Avon  1.4  1.3    1.7 
08 Cornwall  0.6  0.5    0.6 
11 Devon  1.2  1.0    1.3 
12 Dorset  1.1  1.1    1.2 
16 Gloucestershire  1.2  1.0    1.4 
33 Somerset  0.7  0.7    0.9 
39 Wiltshire  0.8  0.8    1.0 
West Midlands  12.9  11.9  11.6  12.1 
18 Hereford and Worcester  1.5  1.5    1.6 
32 Shropshire  0.7  0.8    0.9 
34 Staffordshire  2.0  1.8    1.9 
37 Warwickshire  1.1  1.0    1.1 
46 West Midlands  7.6  6.8    6.7 
East Midlands  8.8  7.9    8.6 
10 Derbyshire  1.9  1.7    2.1 
24 Leicestershire  2.9  2.7    2.3 
25 Lincolnshire  0.8  0.7    0.9 
28 Northamptonshire  1.4  1.4    1.5 
30 Nottinghamshire  1.8  1.5    2.0 
Yorkshire and 
Humberside 
8.6  7.4  7.4  9.0 
20 Humberside  1.3  1.3    1.4 
27 North Yorkshire  0.8  0.7    0.9 
44 South Yorkshire  1.9  1.7    2.1 
47 West Yorkshire  4.6  3.8    4.8   15 
North West  11.1  10.3  10.8  10.3 
06 Cheshire  1.5  1.5    1.6 
42 Greater Manchester  5.4  5.1    4.9 
23 Lancashire  2.4  2.0    2.3 
43 Merseyside  1.7  1.7    1.7 
Northern  3.5  3.4  4.9  4.1 
07 Cleveland  0.6  0.8    0.9 
09 Cumbria  0.5  0.4    0.6 
13 Durham  0.7  0.7    0.9 
29 Northumberland  0.3  0.2    0.3 
45 Tyne and Wear  1.4  1.3    1.5 
Wales  3.8  3.9  5.6  4.2 
60 Clwyd  0.7  0.7    0.9 
61 Dyfed  0.3  0.4    0.3 
62 Gwent  0.7  0.8    0.8 
63 Gwynedd  0.2  0.2    0.2 
64 Mid Glamorgan  0.7  0.7    0.8 
65 Powys  0.2  0.2    0.3 
66 South Glamorgan  0.5  0.6    0.7 
67 West Glamorgan  0.4  0.5    0.5 
Scotland  6.1  5.9  9.3  6.8 
85 Highland  0.2  0.3    0.4 
84 Grampian  0.7  0.8    1.0 
89 Tayside  0.5  0.4    0.5 
81 Central  0.3  0.2    0.3 
83 Fife  0.4  0.4    0.4 
87 Strathclyde  2.8  2.8    2.8 
86 Lothian  0.7  0.8    0.9 
82 Dumfries and Galloway  0.2  0.1    0.3 
80 Borders  0.2  0.1 
  0.3 
90 Island Authorities  0.1  0.1    0.1 
a Full set of figures cannot be displayed for data confidentiality reasons.  
Source: Authors’ calculations using the ARD (Source: ONS). Figures are averages over years. 
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Table B2: Descriptive statistics: mean values by county, 1986-1992* 
County  Diversity measure  Agglomeration measures: number of 4-
digit industry 
    Plants  Foreign plants 
Mean  0.805  31  1 
South East  0.845  70  1 
02 Bedfordshire  0.810  26  1 
03 Berkshire  0.888  36  1 
04 Buckinghamshire  0.880  37  1 
14 East Sussex  0.859  27  0 
15 Essex  0.916  65  1 
50 Greater London  0.930  447  7 
17 Hampshire  0.920  56  1 
19 Hertfordshire  0.867  57  1 
21 Isle of Wight  0.509  3  0 
22 Kent  0.918  56  1 
31 Oxfordshire  0.735  24  1 
36 Surrey  0.888  47  1 
38 West Sussex  0.859  31  1 
East Anglia  0.891  24  1 
05 Cambridgeshire  0.877  28  1 
26 Norfolk  0.896  22  0 
35 Suffolk  0.899  24  0 
South West  0.838  21  0 
01 Avon  0.799  33  1 
08 Cornwall  0.775  13  0 
11 Devon  0.864  24  1 
12 Dorset  0.872  24  0 
16 Gloucestershire  0.885  25  1 
33 Somerset  0.799  14  0 
39 Wiltshire  0.861  18  0 
West Midlands  0.866  52  1 
18 Hereford and Worcester  0.899  30  0 
32 Shropshire  0.826  13  0 
34 Staffordshire  0.831  36  1 
37 Warwickshire  0.845  22  0 
46 West Midlands  0.929  156  2 
East Midlands  0.876  32  1 
10 Derbyshire  0.913  33  1 
24 Leicestershire  0.859  50  1 
25 Lincolnshire  0.832  15  0 
28 Northamptonshire  0.884  26  1 
30 Nottinghamshire  0.891  35  0 
Yorkshire and Humberside   0.889  39  1 
20 Humberside  0.893  24  0 
27 North Yorkshire  0.824  15  0 
44 South Yorkshire  0.897  34  1 
47 West Yorkshire  0.943  85  2 
North West  0.920  53  1   17 
06 Cheshire  0.902  28  1 
42 Greater Manchester  0.958  104  2 
23 Lancashire  0.911  45  1 
43 Merseyside  0.908  36  0 
Northern  0.764  12  0 
07 Cleveland  0.774  13  0 
09 Cumbria  0.675  10  0 
13 Durham  0.847  12  0 
29 Northumberland  0.737  5  0 
45 Tyne and Wear  0.904  28  1 
Wales  0.739  9  0 
60 Clwyd  0.840  12  0 
61 Dyfed  0.648  6  0 
62 Gwent  0.854  13  0 
63 Gwynedd  0.613  4  0 
64 Mid Glamorgan  0.857  14  1 
65 Powys  0.583  4  0 
66 South Glamorgan  0.794  12  0 
67 West Glamorgan  0.767  8  0 
Scotland  0.655  11  0 
85 Highland  0.397  4  0 
84 Grampian  0.805  12  0 
89 Tayside  0.805  8  1 
81 Central  0.672  5  0 
83 Fife  0.745  7  0 
87 Strathclyde  0.944  54  2 
86 Lothian  0.842  15  1 
82 Dumfries and Galloway  0.560  2  0 
80 Borders  0.334  3  0 
90 Island Authorities  0.285  1  0 
Source: Authors’ calculations using the ARD (Source: ONS).  
* Note: Agglomeration measures are calculated for each of 64 counties at the 4-digit-industry-year level. 
Diversity measure is calculated at the county-year level. Figures in column (1) are averages over years 
within county. Figures in columns (2) and (3) are averages over industries and years within county. The 
averages are calculated across the dataset of entrants and possible location choices used in the conditional 
logit model in section 4.1. 
 